Erwin Dekker, historian of economic thought and a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center, joins Henry Oliver to discuss his book, The Viennese Students of Civilization. They explore the intellectual world that shaped F. A. Hayek, how Austrian liberalism differs from rights-based, utilitarian, and libertarian traditions, why markets and law should be understood as evolved cultural institutions, what Vienna's cafΓ© culture contributed to modern social science, how American individualism reshaped Austrian economics, and much more.
Transcript
HENRY OLIVER: I am here with Erwin Dekker. Erwin is a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center, where he works on the history of economic thought. Heβs currently working on a new project about the history of The Chicago School, but we are going to discuss his book, The Viennese Students of Civilization. Erwin, hello.
ERWIN DEKKER: Great to be here. Hello, Henry.
OLIVER: I am going to start by reading out a small quote from your book.
DEKKER: OK.
OLIVER: And then you can discuss that for us.
DEKKER: OK.
OLIVER: Because I thinkβ
DEKKER: Sounds good.
OLIVER: βone of the things youβre trying to do is to make us think differently about Hayek and the Austrians.
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: So, this is from near the end:
Hayek acknowledges that what he believes is true liberalism has died away in most places, and he finds himself in disagreement with both rationalistic liberalism and the English utilitarian liberalism. He expresses some discontent with the label βlibertarianism,β but that is the label now commonly associated with Austrian thought. That association is understandable.
Both Hayek and Mises put forward policies while in the United States that are very much in line with a government that is as minimal as possible. But this book has tried to demonstrate that the more constant element of the Viennese tradition has been a reluctant belief in progress, an outlook that thinks of freedom as a tradition, that has respect for institutions that have proven their worth, but that is at least willing to critically examine the existing and to change it wherever necessary.
Are we getting Hayek wrong? Is he really a conservative?
COUNTERPARTS TO HAYEKβS LIBERALISM
DEKKER: Is he really a conservative? Well, this is a very good question. Right, what I do in that passage is contrast it with a bunch of other more famous liberal traditions. And, of course, the ultimate question would become, is there a third or a fourth liberal tradition of which he really is part? This is how he understood it himself, which is why he wrote the famously βWhy Iβm Not a Conservative.β
But, from these other traditions, he might well look more like a conservative because this fourth liberal tradition, which is more continental, which, like I emphasized there, has a lot of attention to civil society processes, gradual growth, is anti-revolutionary in spirit as one of its outlooks, which is, of course, really quite different if you compare it with libertarianism, which is very anti-socialist, but thatβs not the main opponent.
On the other hand, in its context, it is anti-aristocratic. That it shares with other liberal traditions very, very strongly. But what sets it apart mostly is that itβsβand this is why itβs sometimes related, I think rightly so, to the Scottish Enlightenmentβit just doesnβt have a very firm belief in reason leading to progress, and so it runs up against more rationalistic versions of liberalism wherever it finds them.
These can be rights-based, they can be utilitarian, or they can be other forms of perfectionistic liberalism as we know them, say, around John Rawls. But it runs up against them all the time as unsatisfactory or too ambitious. And so, this liberalism isnβt so ambitious and is very much rooted in traditions, which gives it a very conservative flavor, thatβs for sure.
OLIVER: Letβs just clarify what these different traditions are. Rights-based liberalism is John Locke.
DEKKER: John Locke, yes.
OLIVER: Utilitarian liberalism, at least in England, is John Stuart Mill. Are there any other schools against which we should be placing Hayek and seeing him differently?
DEKKER: Yes. With John Stuart Mill, obviously, you want to also put Bentham in there. And you probably would want to say something about modern economics, whichβ
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: Its very foundations are the utilitarianβ
OLIVER: The neoclassicals.
DEKKER: Yes, the neoclassicals.
OLIVER: Marshall and everyone.
DEKKER: And they are, of course, very relevant as an interlocutor and critical counterpart to Hayekβs thought. And then, yes, in that passage, I somewhat, perhaps most provocatively, suggest that itβs also not American libertarianism.
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: Which, you knowβ
OLIVER: Which is what Hayekβs become in popular imagination.
DEKKER: Absolutely. His teacher, Mises, gives even more grounds for it because Misesβs system of praxeology, as itβs called, is very rationalisticβ
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: βin the sense that it starts from an axiom and then believes it can derive both very fundamental truths in economics, but then also very fundamental truths about politics from this one axiom. I think the debate is ongoing, but Iβm very skeptical of this whole project. I think Hayek, by the time he gets further away from Mises, also physically, he seeks that distance very, very clearly.
And so, those are the three counterparts. The rights-based one seeks to justify things based on the rights that the individual has and seeks to derive from that the limits of political power. The utilitarian one is already quite a bit more ambitious because it seeks to achieve the best state that is possible in the world. It proposes a calculation between people of how we trade off some people being worse off versus everybody being at a somewhat higher level of civilization, as the book suggests. Itβs a kind of formula. Itβs very consequentialist in its thinking, which is obviously very different from the rights-based one, which, as the philosophers would say, is deontic.
This one is somewhere in between because itβs tradition-based. It doesnβt say thereβs a clear starting point from which we can derive very obvious rights. Instead, the starting point is historical, and itβs imperfect. The end point is undefined. To the extent that they might think of an end point, they would think of it as aβthey wouldnβt think of end points. They would think of processes. Right? So, if the one liberalism is about starting points and the other liberalism, the utilitarian tradition, is about end points, then somewhere they emphasize processes in the middle.
OLIVER: If someone is listening to this and theyβve got The Road to Serfdom in mindβ
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: βand what youβre saying does not sound very much like the polemical Hayek of popular imagination, which of Hayekβs works is this most evident in? The essays?
DEKKER: No, itβs not just the essays because that I think isβthereβs a sort of snobbism, obviously, that comes to every intellectual, and I canβt escape that fully in answering your question. But I think the obvious one is The Constitution of Liberty, actually, where a lot of this comes out in the first couple of chapters.
Then if you really want my favorite essay or favorite part of a book, itβs in Law, Legislation, and Liberty toward the very end. Thereβs a postscript, and itβs called βThe Three Sources of Human Values.β I think that is where itβs most obvious. He really, really clearly sets up this idea about human nature, human artifice, and then culture in the middle as being the thing that he cares most about.
But itβs there very obviously in the essay that I think everybody reads but never quite grapples with, βIndividualism: True and False,β in which he just says, βThe individualism of both the rights-based people as well as the libertarians is misguided. In fact, my individualism has something to do with Tocqueville,β which, for a liberal thinker, is not a natural point of reference at all.
AT THE CROSSROADS OF FREE MARKETS AND TRADITION
OLIVER: So, how does this work with Hayek being laissez-faire? The idea is that heβs the cheerleader of free markets and the champion of deregulation and all this stuff, but you have this vision of Hayek as aβheβs rooted in tradition and custom. Whatβs the balance on that? Because we think of the free market as the slayer of tradition.
DEKKER: Yes. Well, first of all, it would suggest that actually marketsβand the anthropologist, who I draw on quite repeatedly in the bookβwould, I think, support this claim. Markets are everywhere. Theyβre not a modern invention, right?
OLIVER: Sure. [chuckles]
DEKKER: Thereβs no magic moment in 1750 when we all of a sudden start trading. Trade seems to be quite fundamental to humans interacting, and so they are a tradition. His major argument in the 20th century against the planners is, βYou want to destroy this tradition.β Now, obviously, once something is destroyed, there are difficult questions to be asked about whether they can be reintroducedβ
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: Right? And what this reintroduction would mean, what it would draw upon. A question that I thinkβespecially given that the book is quite geographically oriented in situating all of it in Vienna, the Habsburg Empire extending far into Eastern Europeβthe obvious question is what do you do after, say, the fall of communism, which had tried to abolish markets quite seriously? Is there then enough of a tradition on which we can build to reconnect new traditions of markets? Even there, I think the deregulation Hayek is really a caricatureβ
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: βbecause it suggests that you could do something like shock therapy, or it suggests that you could just move away from all the interventions and be OK. I think that would really be not his vision at all, right? And so this is theβ
OLIVER: But there areβ
DEKKER: βyes, the double aspect. He doesnβt think you can get rid of the aristocracy overnight, whichβ
OLIVER: Sure.
DEKKER: βmakes him look fairly conservative in the 19thβ
OLIVER: Yes, yes. [chuckles]
DEKKER: βcentury, when those questions come up in the Habsburg Empire. But it also makes him look fairly conservative in the 1990s when he is asked, and everybody sees the fall of communism as his triumph, and he is cautious. Heβs like, βYes, I donβt know whether we should expect these societies to turn around overnightβor we shouldnβt.β
OLIVER: But there are instances, arenβt there? He wrote to Margaret Thatcher and said, βYou should push these policies further.β
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: βYouβre not doing enough.β And she said, βWell, itβs a democracy. I can only do as much as the voters will allow or tolerate.β There is a sense in which he had a radical involvement in politics, is there?
HAYEKβS LIBERALISM: BUILDING ON TRADITION
DEKKER: Yes, but there are two things I would say against that. First, when he thinks of Germany after the war, he gives a lecture toβ
OLIVER: This is after the second war.
DEKKER: This is after the Second World War.
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: Yes. Thereβs the question of reconstruction, right?
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: He says to the historians, βIf youβre going to reconstruct liberalism in Germany, you have to construct a liberal past on which this new Germany is going to base itself.β You canβt just say, βOK, from now on, weβre going to be English. Weβre going to have British liberalism in Germany, and weβre just going to shed our own past.β [laughter]
He goes to some length by pointing out various people. I think the whole exercise [chuckles] seems maybe somewhat artificial to reconstruct this German liberal tradition, although I genuinely believe there is one. But, he does that. And then, the same thingβ
OLIVER: But he sees that the kind of liberalism that a country will have will evolve naturally out of the culture and the history of that country. You canβt just templateβ
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: βan international version.
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: Yes, absolutely. And so, the reason that The Road to Serfdom, I think, actually looks the way it looks is itβs very much written with the British audience in mind. You see this in all the epigraphs, the little quotations at the start of every chapter. You see it in his references, in which heβs trying to hide all his German reference points [laughter] and substitute them for English reference points.
Heβs trying to say, βLook, Iβm one of you guys,β which is, obviously, also an important point to make, right? If you come from continental Europe, youβre writing a book warning the British about their own mistakes, youβre up against it. Your rhetorical position is fairly weak because you come from one of the suspicious countries that actually gave in to fascism, while the British are protecting free societies, and then youβre telling them that theyβre not doing it in the right way. This is a steep, steep hill to climb. [laughter] He goes the length to actuallyβyou could say βwhitewash,β but I think the better way of saying it would be βcontextualizeββwhat sort of liberalism that the Brits always had.
OLIVER: Heβs not so far away from Churchillβs position in that sense.
DEKKER: No.
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: No, not at all.
OLIVER: Where does his advice to Chile fit into this?
DEKKER: I donβt think he gives much advice to Chile.
OLIVER: OK.
DEKKER: I think the historical studies really now show that to the extent that thereβs extensive, actual advice to Chile, it comes from people affiliated with Chicagoβnot actually Milton Friedman, who does give a lecture but does little beyond that. Hayekβs own involvement and actual comments on the situation take the form of opinionating about the developments in Chile rather thanβ
OLIVER: Telling them what to do.
DEKKER: Yes, telling them what to do.
OLIVER: OK.
DEKKER: But certainly, I think every time a major transition comes up, whether itβs currently Milei or so in South America, thereβsβI think the Hayekian question would be, βWhat sort of tradition are they going to build on?β What sort of liberalism do they envision, and what sort of narrative can they tell that this is, in fact, a return or a continuation of local traditions of freedom.
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: And that would, I think, at least be the consistent Hayekian position. Whether he always acted exactly according to these principles, I donβt know.
OLIVER: Sure, sure. Thatβs certainly true in the British context. The Thatcher governments are often called radical, but Nigel Lawson said, βWe thought of ourselves as going back to Gladstoneββ
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: ββgoing back to the original liberalism of England. Everyone else had made the great departure. We were trying to return.β
DEKKER: So, this is, interestingly, what he does. Some reviewers have commented on a bit of abuse of language I do in the book, but Hayek has a book called The Counter-Revolution [of] Science. Itβs a funny thing, because if you think that the other people have been involved in a revolution to overthrow traditions and conceived wisdom, then there is a call or a necessity of doing something like a counterrevolution. Right?
Now, this is not exactly the way he uses the term and why he picks the title. I think that is true, but I think this ethos of being a counterrevolutionary and returning to an older, good version of the country that obviously even modern reform movements, I think, in Britain, in one way or another, appeal toβ
OLIVER: Oh, very strongly.
DEKKER: βthat there was an age in which Britain was right. I think, actually, the fairer critique of that point is: What did those liberalisms actually look like?
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: Right? Which, especially if you come from the Habsburg Empire, is a fairly relevant [laughter] question. Is there an Austrian or a Habsburg moment to which one can return as being a good form of liberalism? And here, I think the Austrian answer has something to do with these gradual processes. So, itβs not so much that itβs conservative in restoring, but itβs conservative in saying, βWell, we overthrew too much of the stuff that was naturally growing.β This leads both to backlash, but also to a forgetting of what the project was about.
STUDENTS OF CIVILIZATION
OLIVER: Now, weβre talking a lot about Hayek, but you put him in the book as part of this bigger school.
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: We think of them as economists, but you have this idea that they are students of civilization, and the economics is part of the way that they work as intellectuals, to try and understand what is civilization, how do we preserve it, how does it work, questions of that nature. You focus on the idea of culture. Can you tell us, thoughβeconomists love talking about culture, and I never know. What do they mean? What is culture?
DEKKER: Modern economists have taken a bit to talking about culture. Iβm not sure what they mean whenβ
OLIVER: [laughs] Itβs not just me.
DEKKER: It might just be that, in econometrics, you have the βerrorβ term, and you want to pull things out of the βerrorβ term, which is the stuff youβve left unexplained. βNow weβve put all the socioeconomic factors in there, so now the next set of variables must somehow be cultural.β
OLIVER: Itβs a sort of miscellaneous category.
DEKKER: Yes, I think for a lot of current researchers it is. There are a few more serious attempts, but let me try to say what I suggest that itβ
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: βwas to them. I think the most modern way of saying what it is, itβs a set of cooperative technologies. Hayek has this phrase, βlaw, language, and money.β And so they are, you could say, general-purpose social technologies. They can be used for many, many different things.
As Hayek says it in one of the essays in Law, Legislation, and Liberty, itβs [that] theyβre means-connected, not ends-connected. They allow for cooperation of people with quite different ends. Right? This also makes them, you could say, βimperfect language.β Youβre a greatβ
OLIVER: Indeed.
DEKKER: βstudent of it. Itβs used for poetry, but itβs also used for communication. Itβs used for warning. Itβs used for persuasion. It serves many, many different purposes.
This is true for markets, too, in the Austrian understanding, and itβs true for law. Law is also one of those general-purpose technologies that has evolved to serve, in fact, many different purposes, many different individual ends. Originally, this wasnβt the case.
This is the story of evolution that Hayek tells us. They wereβand this is very congruent with, say, Georg Simmel or so, the sociologist. They wereβfirst, the rules that societies come up with are very ends-directed, but as societies grow more complex, the rules become much more general, and they move away from ends, and they are about the justness of the process itself.
And so, these cooperative technologies are what they consider culture. They consider them absolutely vital to making societies run, but the unique thing about them is that nobody came up with them.
OLIVER: Yes, yes.
DEKKER: They were never designed, which is a reason heβs also not too fond of constitutional traditions, because the constitutional traditions of liberalism actually suggest that thereβs a moment of design during which you come up with the set of rules that is going to govern society successfully. Here, once again, I think he sides with tradition. He emphasizes the common lawβso, this part of England he likes a lot, the common law tradition.
OLIVER: This is slightly different from norms, manners, customsβ
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: βgeneralβbecause when we say culture, we think of the way people talk to their neighbors, the sorts of lifestyles. Youβre getting at something slightly different, I think.
DEKKER: I believe I do, but the question of norms is difficult in the following sense: that a lot of these legal rules and also language emerge out of smaller forms of interaction. In this conception, laws are not very different from norms that, at some point, have become written down and generalized. They are rooted in these everyday interactions, but they are the most generalized versions of them.
Now, is this very different from others? In the book, I try to argue that this was a fairly shared view of what culture was doing. I cite BronisΕaw Malinowski a couple of times. I draw quite heavily on Norbert Eliasβs idea of the civilizing process. They all use the word βcivilizationβ for it.
I think reading the book again in preparation for this and a while ago, I feel that the whole book is quite defensive about the concept of civilizationβ
OLIVER: [chuckles] Yes.
DEKKER: βlike, βOh, itβs not this, and I donβt mean to imply that,β and so on. But this is the concept that they used at the time, so that they find useful. It is different, at the very least, from the actual expressions of culture. So, itβs different from literature and art. Those are the things that result from it. It is not science itself. Those are enabled by these cooperative technologies.
COLD FISH IN RED VIENNA
OLIVER: Yes. One of the most striking things is that theyβre very passionate about civilization. You tell this wonderful story. I think itβs Mises walking down the street and saying, βThis will all be grass. Weβre going to let civilization fall. This is so terrible.β But theyβre actually not very interested in the symphony or the novel. Theyβre living at a time of wonderful, wonderful high culture, and they seem almost not to notice.
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: Civilization is all around them, [laughs] and they donβt care. Yeah. Are they philistines?
DEKKER: Are they philistines? Let me first elaborate a bit on that anecdote about Mises walking on the Ringstrasse, because the best cultural history of Vienna is fairly old now, but itβs written by Carl Schorske, and he uses the Ringstrasse, which is this ring street around the center of Vienna. If youβve ever been, you canβt have missed it. Used to be a military encampment, so it was used for the protection of the city. Carl Schorske, in his wonderful cultural history, uses the fact that it was transformed into the Ringstrasse as the ultimate bourgeois victoryβ
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: βbecause the Ringstrasse is now populated by the university, the parliament, the theater, the opera.
OLIVER: The shops.
DEKKER: Yes, the shops.
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: And so, it replaced the old aristocratic and maybe also somewhat defensive idea of what this empire was, and it now became open and governed by the bourgeois with all these bourgeois institutions.
But yes, it is true, and we talked about this before: They donβt seem to be particularly excited about the culture that is happening around them, right? So, this is how the book starts a bit, that everybody was there, the best philosophers of the age, the best composers of the age, maybe the best visual artists, although thatβs debatable, but with Klimt and Schiele and so on.
OLIVER: Itβs clearly an innovative and exciting time in the arts.
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: And thatβs happening all around them. They never engage either with the content or with the fact that all of this is happening, which I think is puzzling. What I do argue in the bookβand I hope this is somewhat convincingβis that they actually grapple with some of the same major cultural problems that have also madeβwell, especially the novelists in Vienna famousβbut I would also think motivate some of the inventions around modern art.
They typically go in a different direction, which is maybe part of the reason that they appear somewhat uninterested. A lot of the artists either embrace the new coming world. This is most clear in the architecture of the city, which is associated also with the political project of what is sometimes called Red Vienna. There, they strip the world of ornaments, and they make it functional, and this is exactly what they oppose because they rightly associate this with planning the economy.
It is also different from modern art traditions that seek to find new forms because, in some sense, theyβre trying to say, βWe have to build on the old forms.β Maybe that explains a little bit why their sensibilities are not attuned to it, but even so, my book would have been all the richer if they had either critiqued it or engaged with it in one way or another. They havenβt, which is somewhat disappointing.
OLIVER: When you read people like Mises, though, he is a bit of a cold fish. Heβs a bit dry.
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: Is part of their ability to study civilization the fact that they are naturally detached from it, and that they have personality that keeps them somewhat removed, and so they can observe it and document it in a way? Is it somehow a businessβ
DEKKER: Theyβre not caught up.
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: Theyβre distant observers.
OLIVER: The fact that they donβt feel in response to the art and the music necessarily is maybe an important part of their ability to understand how it is able to be produced.
DEKKER: Yes, and I make quite a bit in the book too of the theme of restraint and self-restraint in their book, which maybe also makesβ
OLIVER: Yes, we should say thatβs the definition of societies.
DEKKER: Yes. All of that is true, but Hermann Brochβs book, The Sleepwalkers, talks about people beingββdancing on the volcano,β I think, is one of the expressions. I donβt know how well that works in English, but in Dutch we certainly say this is a decadence of partying on while the world is in decline.
Hermann Broch sees this world in decline very, very sharply. So, in some sense, they could have aligned themselves, I think, with expressions like that. In fact, thereβs one book to which Mises refers, which, in a more historical sense, has very much the same theme. Iβm not sure whether that explains all of it, because I think they could have found in cultural expressions various forms, andβyes.
LIBERALISM AS APPLIED ECONOMICS
OLIVER: In Misesβs book, Liberalism, he says somewhere in the backβit might be in the notes or somethingβbut he says, βLiberalism is applied economics.β And youβre sort of, βThatβs quite a desiccated,ββ
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: ββastonishing thing for him to have said.β Presumably, he didnβt quite mean it or it was a moment of excess or whatever, but thereβs some feeling of that when you read these people thatβ
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: βthey can see it, but they canβt really get involved in it somehow.
DEKKER: This is absolutely true, right? Itβs also how Mises responds to World War I, which I think is an earlier instance of this. He says, βAll this fighting, this heroism, this romantic longing to struggle for something higher than oneself, all of this is irrational [laughter] and atavistic. It belongs to the 19th century, but no longer to the 20th century.β So, if we could only take the position that maybe you describe as them having themselves, I think that there might be a lot of truth to it. I want toβ
OLIVER: In a funny way, thatβs what the Bloomsburys thought.
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: Theyβre inverse of each other.
DEKKER: Yes. The Bloomsbury [group], though, to me, appear[s] more decadent.
OLIVER: Oh, much more.
DEKKER: They are more the ones dancing on the volcano.
OLIVER: Yes, yes.
DEKKER: I think the interesting transition that actually happens to Hayek more so than Misesβor, maybe I should make it more a generational argument, but itβs always easy to talk through individuals rather than through generations. But they feel that they cannot simply analyze the decline. They also, at some point, have to become involved in the process. They cannot merely be onlookers. So, youβre absolutely right in emphasizing the perspective of the onlooker. I compare it in the book also to the anatomist.
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: Somebody died. Letβs now figure outβ
OLIVER: Letβs cut them open.
DEKKER: βwhat the causes of death were. [laughter] Yes, cut them open. They feel that that is unsatisfactory in response to the civilizational crisis that theyβre experiencing. Or maybe they see new glimmers of hope to which they want to catch on, and so then they transform their project into one that tries to reestablish rather than merely observe. In the book, I use both Karl Popperβs Open Society and Its Enemies as well as Hayekβs work around The Road to Serfdom as exemplary for this kind of move.
THE ROMANTIC AUSTRIANS
OLIVER: Now, you mentioned Misesβs aversion to Romantic ideals. When this school moves to America, the Austrian school of thought does become more Romantic.
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: How does this break occur, and how has it affected the way we look back at Hayek and Mises and the others? Should we keep a distinct idea in mind that thereβs the Romantic Austrians and the un-Romantic Austrians?
DEKKER: Well, mow, youβre making quite a lot of βRomantic.β I think what happens it does fuse with American individualism. Itβs just undeniable that if you go to the 1974 meeting of Austrian economics, which [is] often pointed out as the Austrian revival. Itβs the moment in which really a new generation of American economists and other social scientists come together and rediscover and form a community that is going to cultivate these ideas.
Theyβve all read Ayn Rand. They all now have an image of heroic individuals, and they like this self-image too. In fact, Mises, I think, in his own self-presentation, contributes to this self-image, that theyβre fighting the world and fighting all the major developments of the 20th century. Ocourse, Ayn Rand as being from the communist world and now coming to the West to tell them what is really great about them. I think they share this ethos.
This gives everybody there already a Romantic self-image because they are now the ones who see right through all the illusions that have gripped the others, and they are going to defend something thatβs bigger than theirs. To that is added American individualism, which I always like to trace back to the American Romantic poets, Emerson and Thoreau and so on. An idea that itβs ultimately the individual who makes their own lives and ultimately makes the world around them, which is, I think, almost 180 degrees opposite from Hayek arguing that for civilization to work, we have to submit to social rules, to conventions, to morals.
OLIVER: Completely un-Emersonian.
DEKKER: Yes, because the very actions and ethos of Emerson are, βI am the individual who is able to break these conventions.β You just brought up Bloomsbury.
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: This is how Hayek ultimately also morally condemns Keynes, right?
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: Keynes is the breaker of conventions, and this is ultimately what makes him suspicious and also unreliable. Because tomorrow, he might decide to break a new one, [laughter] and then heβs no longer in his old position. Which is much a shared position, by the way, abroad about Keynes, is that every five years, he changes his position based on whoβs in government and what the current social problem is. Taking up the mantle of tradition is also an interesting rhetorical move against the flip-floppy nature of Keynesβs newest book.
FROM DOCUMENTERS TO DOERS
OLIVER: You talked about how, in response to the decadence, they see the need to not just document or anatomize but do somethingβbuild new institutions, try and change the course of history, as it were. What is it that they do, and how successful are they?
DEKKER: That is a very, very complicated question. βHow successful are they?β puts me in a place to evaluate where they had successes and where they did not have successes. I think theyβre successful on this most important level: Their legacies have lived on, and their particular perspectives on what went wrong in the 20th century in terms of diagnosis have become some of the most discussed diagnoses of what went wrong and maybe also the most widely accepted diagnoses of what went wrong. After that, Iβm not very sure.
I donβt think their positive programs maybe were either as developed as one might wish for them to really leave very obvious legacies. But the other part of it is just that thereβs mostly contestation over what their positive program would look like. You just talked about this more heroic or Romantic individualism that gets added to it in America. I would add to this something that I donβt think people think about at all but they thought about the entire time, is European peace. Both Mises and Hayek were proponents of federal institutions at the European level.
OLIVER: Something like what we have in the E.U.
DEKKER: Yes, something like what we have in the E.U. Now, if youβd ask any Ameriβ
OLIVER: Which we should just pause and say itβs remarkable to think of Hayek as pro-EU.
DEKKER: Yes. No, I suppose so, but he was. His own students contributed quite a bit to the formation of the World Trade Organization, which, maybe, because itβs focused on trade, feels a bit more in line, but again, itβs inventing a new level of government.
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: Right? Letβs not underestimate how much theyβre thinking of that. This is how they look back at the Habsburg Empire. It governed at least eight, but by some counts 28 nations, and it kept them together and prevented internal war between them. It gave them a limited but significant set of political institutions that were overarching and that prevented this thing from collapsing.
So, this is the first worry they have after World War II, is, βHow do we somehow ensure that Easternββsometimes they call it SoutheasternββEurope is developed and is pulled into these institutions?β And of course, it isnβt. I think this is another thing that is easily forgotten, if you take a Western European perspective, is Europe and America gave up on Eastern Europe. They just decided that it wasnβt worth fighting anymore. The Russians had liberated Eastern Europe, and now Eastern Europe was, for all intents and purposes, Russian.
OLIVER: Yes. Left to its fate.
DEKKER: Yes, left to its own fate. This, I think rightly so, by some in Eastern Europe, is still seen as a fatal betrayal. But it certainly hit home for these people from Vienna. Obviously, Vienna now is just right on the border of where the Iron Curtain was, but it excluded large parts of what they considered to be part of their home, including Poland, where Mises was born, if we take current geographical borders as being relevant; Ukraine, over which, of course, weβre currently still fightingβthat was an important part of the Habsburg Empire.
To them, itβs not at all obvious that even that is the right institutional setup. They would have been much more ambitious about what this new world should have looked like also in terms of international governance. I think this is a very different legacy thatβs not typically associated with them. They havenβt been at all successful, one could say, in finding that language. Also among, I think, modern liberals, this kind of international imagination largely lost.
HOMESCHOOLING, THE ALPS, AND THE SCHOLARLY ART OF LOAFING AROUND
OLIVER: Hayek and the others are very interested in institutions. They think institutions are very important. There comes a point when most of them begin working in it. Hayek goes to the LSE. New York University becomes an important school of Austrian thought. But in the early part, a lot of what you discuss in the book, itβs not an institutional movement. Theyβre just in the cafΓ©.
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: And thereβs an interestingβI donβt know if itβs a contradiction or not, but what you call βtherapeutic nihilism,β which is the intellectuals just lamenting over things and not doing anything useful. Hayekβs opposed to that, and he wants institutions to fight back. But actually, it was outside of the institutions that they developed and emerged, and in a way, you could say, did their best work. Are they too keen on institutions? Is there some contradiction in the way they lived and what they propose?
DEKKER: This is a great question because I think the word βinstitutionsβ doesnβt feature heavily in my book. I donβt think it features heavily in their own writings. Now, I think you can be nuanced about this, right? We just talked about international cooperation. Certainly, institutions were not off the radar, but they thought of the most important things as springing from tradition and customs.
The custom that explains Viennaβs intellectual life was homeschooling. [laughter] All these aristocratic families were all homeschooling their kids in one way or another, and they developed a scientific culture in the home. Itβs unimaginable for us now, but a lot of them were amateur scientists or quite serious scientists. If you goβ
OLIVER: It was also a philosophical culture.
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: The interest in mathematics, yes.
DEKKER: Yes. Itβs absolutely amazing if you hear Hayek talk about his childhood because then he just happened to know one of the most important biologists from later on, [laughter] Karl von Frisch, who is very famous for his experiments with bees.
Thereβs a thing that this all happened in the home. Thereβs another great book by Deborah Coen that talks about one of these families, the Exner family. She also emphasizes how important the summer retreat into the Alps was. This, in fact, for Hayekβs personal life, later becomes very relevant because essentially they missed the summers, so heβs always reimagining academic positions that allow him to have a summer in the Alps.
But, yes, itβs practices. Thatβs how I try to capture it in the book. I think one of the subheadings is βThe conversation as scholarly practice,β and I emphasize the social circles in which this happens. The very informality of these allowed discipline-crossing and boundary-crossing, and maybe also a bit of this crossing of what you do, whether itβs normative or positive or intellectual or scientific and so on. All these lines were less fixed than they would have been in a more institutional setting.
OLIVER: Yes.
DEKKER: I argue toward the end of the book that, in fact, Hayek was always trying to recreate this very setting, so whether itβs in the Mont Pelerin Society or in his dreams to bring back all the great intellectuals to Vienna, which goes absolutely nowhere, but theyβre attempts to recreate this culture. Thereβs also when he comes to the University of Chicago, he sets up a seminar on the scientific method the first year, and heβs absolutely delighted that he gets Enrico Fermi, a very famous physicist, to come, and other intellectuals from various disciplines, because this is what he imagined scholarly life to be: Itβs that the best people from various disciplines come along. Theyβre very attracted to these institutes for advanced study that, for instance, Princeton is famous for, that has cultivated some of this.
But this gets largely crowded out. Social science becomes governed by the foundations that set up large-scale social scientific projects as team projects in which a lot of people become scientific workers rather than generalists and so on.
OLIVER: The bureaucratization.
DEKKER: Yes, but also empirical social science just has a very different logic of organization that comes with it. It just requires a data collection analysis of [an] almost mechanical kind. Of course, it never becomes quite mechanical, though maybe now it might becomeβ
OLIVER: No, but you canβt do it by sitting around with coffee and talking for three hours.
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: Yes, itβsβyes.
DEKKER: But yes, weirdly, even some of the people who establish art history as a discipline in the United States come out of this Viennese culture, which just happened to be incredibly rich and invigorating and indeed happened outside of institutions. Maybe this is a liberal point that liberalism is actually not about defending the institutions that are, or perfecting them, but is actually a critique of institutionalization. But this is hard with the other sides of Hayek in mind. If we think that the institutions are restraining, then it is actually fairly compatible with his kind of liberalism. Maybe this is something we have to think more about it.
The one thing I would say is that for him, freedom, conversations, but also things like science are just outgrowths of these microphenomena. They cannot be designed or even stimulated top-down. The conversations have to happen for a scientific seminar to be of good quality. What you cannot do is tell everybody to come together once a week and then have a good conversation. Even there, the Hayekian perspective, I think, would be you need all those good conversations, and that makes the seminar at the end of the week especially fruitful.
OLIVER: Should modern intellectualsβweβre very institutional these days.
DEKKER: Yes.
OLIVER: Should there be some loosening of strictures, more time in the cafΓ©, just less monitoring, less measuring, just a greater sense that you should be loafing around a little bit?
DEKKER: Absolutely. [laughter] Absolutely.
OLIVER: If our managers are listening. [chuckles]
DEKKER: Just before we were starting, one of the producers of the show actually commented on this loafing because our current fellowship programs include lunches, dinners, and an open bar into the evening, and theyβre, I think, meant to stimulate exactly this. They also embodied something else, is that people come from disciplines ranging from biology to the arts and rhetoric and communication now, and everything in between. I think weβre rebuilding something of that sort.
Now, of course, the question is, how do you sustain it? Part of the lament, maybe in the book, is that once they go to the United States, it is hard to sustain because somehow the context is missing. Everybody competes for a university position somewhere, somehow, because they miss the family and social context that allowed for all of this conversation to happen. Some of them, obviously, also lose a lot of the inherited wealth that made some of it possible. The constraints are more severe.
Also, when you now try to set it up again, I donβt know whether it can compete with the incentives in broader academia. But yes, absolutely, loaf around. Read outside your discipline. I never know quite what discipline Iβm in. [laughter] This is great, and it helps.
DEKKERβS UPCOMING BOOK PROJECT
OLIVER: Now, we should say youβre working now on a totally different place. This book is very Viennese. Theyβre all in Vienna walking around together, and thereβs some influence of place that creates the particular ideas they have. Youβre now studying Chicago, which is obviously [chuckles] a very different place. How does that change the way they work and the sorts of conclusions they come to?
DEKKER: I hope it changes nearly everything. You live with your own books for a while, and then you become estranged from them, maybe, during certain periods. One way in which Iβm estranged from this book is that they are not quite aristocratic but very well-off intellectuals from deep philosophical traditions, and you can point to what other great thinkers they were next to.
I come from a working-class background, went through schools in which I was the odd one out, then later discovered how big this intellectual world was. But Iβve always felt that whatever I do, I somehow have to explain at a family reunion or so on what Iβm doing. This is hard, and that book is of no help whatsoever. [laughter]
But I was working in Rotterdam for quite a number of years. Now, Rotterdamβyouβre from Britainβis a bit like Liverpool or maybe Manchester. Itβs a harbor town with lots of blue-collar workers. We say, βDonβt talk about it; be about it,β or something of the sort, or the Dutch equivalent of that. And so, I thought, βI have to somehow capture this kind of intellectual atmosphere much more,β and that will also counter even more strongly this idea that somehow cultures are shaped by the intellectuals in the coffee shops, and then somehow the ideas trickle down.
Instead, I wanted the opposite. I wanted somehow whatβI donβt knowβmy parents were talking about at the shop floor to somehow shape the ideas and the attitudes of a city. And so, I looked around. Chicago is a very important place for American social science, both in sociology and in economics. I now know it also has a very rich literary tradition, which, by labels, is mostly called βrealistβ or something of the sort. I think itβs a very bad label to think about it, but it is always concerned with underdogs.
It is very focused on usefulness because if your ideas are not useful, theyβre merely talk or speculation or something of the sort, which already captures some of what exactly my family would say at a family reunion, like, βWhat is the use of this? Are you even working?β They also question whether Iβm doing it, if it should even count as work, whether itβs worthy of earning a salary, especially one thatβs higher than maybe some of them are earning. Itβs all of those things, and all of those things come together in Chicago, and then what gets added in Chicago, I think, is migration.
One of the themes I actually regret in this book as not emphasizing more: Vienna was a hub for especially Jews who were persecuted in the rest of Eastern Europe to go. More generally, Vienna was rapidly growing during this period of time, and this is even more obvious in Chicago. Itβs a city of new ideas, new people trying to make a new world. What especially sociologists are very good at is just describing. What are these new worlds that are coming about?
Itβs first captured by the journalists in the newspapers. Itβs captured by confessionals and low-quality or maybe low-prestige sort of literature, confessionals of a thief that just tells what kind of cons he used to run on the streets of Chicago. That then inspires the sociologists to think, βWell, let me see how these cons are doing at the moment, how people make a living, how they justify conning other people out of their money, what is considered legitimate.β
I think all of those things now are starting to come together in my project on Chicago, and theyβre a way to, I think, counter this particular element of the Vienna book thatβIβm not sure whether itβs completely guilty of it, but itβs ultimately a trickle-down model of intellectual influence. I want the grassroots version or the percolating from the bottom to the top. How are intellectuals? Also, how do they justify to the people around them that theyβre doing all this speculative stuff? Whatβs the use? Why all these books? Why all this reflection on life? Why not simply do it? I think those tensions are perfectly captured in Chicago.
OLIVER: I look forward to reading it. Erwin Dekker, this was delightful. Thank you very much.
DEKKER: Wonderful. Thank you, Henry.










